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POLITICAL ASSASSINATION IN EGYPT, 1910-1954*

Donald M. Reid

> Every Englishman in Egypt became a candidate for execution and for joining his colleagues who had preceded him to the hereafter. The name of a new candidate came up a few days later.... The Ministry of Education had issued a decree that law be taught in Arabic at the School of Law, after having been taught in English and French.... But Mr. Robson, the English professor at the School still gave his lectures in English....
>
> And the English professor was a fanatic for the occupation, detesting Egyptians, haughty in his scorn as though he were the one who had founded the British Empire: "If you have the strength, fight us on the battle field and beat us and seize your independence with arms." This was sufficient justification to send the good professor to his eternal resting place.
>
> We began to observe him as he came out of the School of Law every day at 1 p.m., riding his bicycle to his house in Garden City via Giza Street, crossing the bridges over the Nile....
>
> I was one of the students who listened to the last lecture on civil law Mr. Robson gave a little before noon on the day on which we had decided to put an end to his arrogance....
>
> I gave the signal quickly to Mahmud 'Uthman, pointing my finger at Robson. Mahmud 'Uthman got on his bicycle to pursue Robson's bicycle and give the arranged signal to the executioners so they would be ready to meet the haughty Briton. Robson reached the point where fate lay in wait for him and where death was lurking. There my brother 'Abd al-Hamid 'Anayat was hiding with his hand on the trigger of his revolver. When Robson was in front of him 'Abd al-Hamid attacked him, firing shots which hit him in the back.
>
> Then Robson fell off his bicycle and forgot that he was the son of the Empire which would not leave Egypt

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> except by the sword. He let out a cry for help from the pain of the horrible wounds, and help came like a lightning flash in the form of three bullets which Ibrahim Musa shot into the head of the wounded Englishman....
>
> The fruit of success came more quickly than we expected, for the Ministry of Education issued a decree appointing in Robson's place an Egyptian judge who taught civil law in Arabic.[1]

Egypt was seething with frustration at the on-going British presence in 1947 when 'Abd al-Fattah 'Anayat published this lurid recollection of an assassination twenty-five years earlier. No wonder the British ambassador vigorously protested 'Anayat's inflammatory articles to Egyptian prime minister Nuqrashi.[2] Nuqrashi must have felt uncomfortable. As a member of the secret apparatus of the Wafd (Egypt's main nationalist party), Nuqrashi had once helped organize assassinations himself - perhaps even that of Robson. Now, as a prime minister whose friend and predecessor Ahmad Mahir had been assassinated just two years before, he could hardly condone such incendiary journalism.

Nuqrashi was not the only Egyptian politician to have been on both sides of the fence. The killing of President Anwar al-Sadat has again brought the subject of Middle Eastern assassination to the fore, but few of the commentaries have noted that Sadat remained proud of his part in the assassination of anglophile politician Amin Uthman and the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas in the 1940s.

The purpose of this article is to study assassinations in Egypt between 1910 and 1954, and to set these incidents in the context of general Egyptian history and of assassinations in the Middle East and elsewhere.[3] The study was essentially complete before Sadat's assassination and does not dwell on the post-1954 period, but it should provide a useful historical background for that dramatic vent.

"Assassination is the deliberate, extralegal killing of an individual for political purposes."[4] The authors of this definition, which will serve for this study, go on to note that the political motive sets the assassin apart from the ordinary murderer. The killer must also single his victim out, not simply be attacking members of a hated group at random. The assassin rarely knows his victim personally - the Robson case is exceptional - or derives concrete

[1] 'Abd al-Fattah 'Anayat, *Qissat Kifah* (Cairo, n.d.), 81-83. A British view of the incident is found in the "Situation Report" of the Public Security Department for 21-31 December 1922, enclosed in FO371/8973/E651, Allenby to FO, 7 January 1923. FO references are to the records of the British Foreign Office, housed in the Public Record Office, London.

[2] FO371/62991/J2390, Campbell to Bevin, 19 May 1947.

[3] Carefully defined and neutrally used, "terrorist" and "terrorism" can be useful terms for a study aspiring to objectivity. They have been used more for polemics than for description of late, however, and they are avoided in this article except where they reflect the usage of others whose views are being examined. "Assassin" and "assassination" evoke strong emotions also. There seems to be no good way to avoid them, however, and they are used neutrally here.

[4] Murray Clark Havens, Carl Leiden, and Karl M. Schmitt, *The Politics of Assassination* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970), 4. See also 2-3.

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personal benefit from his act. Except in the title of this article, I also follow the suggestion that the term "political assassination" is redundant.

The first part of this article is a narrative account of the events under study. It shows that Egyptian assassinations came in two main waves - one after each war - with a lesser cluster of assassinations or attempted assassinations between 1910 and 1915 and another in the 1930s. The analysis in the second part takes up a series of questions. How much did previous Middle Eastern and Western political violence influence Egyptian assassins? Does the periodization of Egyptian assassinations resemble patterns elsewhere? What were the social backgrounds and political and personal motivations of Egyptian assassins? Were these killings individual acts or the products of conspiracies? What was the public reaction to the assassinations? What impact did they have on the political system? With these questions in mind let us turn to our review of the events themselves.

Early Assassinations and Attempts, 1910-1915

The first series of assassination attempts began suddenly with the fatal shooting of Prime Minister Butrus Ghali in 1910 and ended with the execution or imprisonment of those responsible for attempts on the Egyptian sultan and a cabinet minister in 1915.[5] Although Ghali's killing was the first public assassination of a prominent political figure in Egypt in more than a century, it did not shatter an era of tranquility. By the end of Consul-General Lord Cromer's long reign (1883-1907) as de facto ruler of Egypt, nationalist protest - under the leadership of fiery young Mustafa Kamil - was already under way. Ibrahim Nasif al-Wardani, Ghali's self-confessed assassin, was a twenty-three-year-old pharmacist who belonged to the late Kamil's Watani Party. The son of a deceased provincial administrator and the nephew of a pasha, Wardani had studied in Lausanne, Paris, and London. Although he may have acted alone, Wardani belonged to a secret Society of Fraternal Solidarity. Its members included young professionals and students in the higher schools. The British discovered to their dismay that because Egypt lacked a conspiracy law, they had to let the other members of Wardani's society go free.

Butrus Ghali had given the nationalists plenty of reason for hating him. He had presided at the notorious Dinshaway trial in 1906 when Egyptian peasants were sentenced to death for a scuffle with British troops. Anwar al-Sadat was among those who grew up with the name of the martyred "hero of Dinshaway" on their lips.[6] As prime minister since 1908, Ghali had implemented a stringent press law and supported a British scheme to extend the foreign-owned Suez Canal

[5]Sir Thomas Russel Pasha, *Egyptian Service 1902-1946* (London, 1949), 214-215, sees a pattern of two periods of assassination. The first runs from 1910 to 1925. After a twelve-year interval, the second period runs from 1937 to 1946, the year his account ends. On the Ghali affair, see the detailed account of the trial in Mahmud 'Asim, *al-Murafa'at fi Ash'har al-Qadaya* (Cairo, 1933), Bk. 2, 81-226; the confession of Shafiq Mansur, "History of the Secret Societies in Egypt," enclosed in FO371/10899/J2008, Henderson to Chamberlain, 6 July 1925; and Samir Seikaly, "Prime Minister and Assassin: Butrus Ghali and Wardani," *Middle Eastern Studies*, XIII (1977), 112-123.

[6]Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York, 1979), 5-6.

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Company's concession for fifty years. Ghali's being a Coptic Christian particularly incensed Muslim extremists.

The judges at Wardani's intensely political trial included an Englishman who had sat on the Dinshaway court. Ibrahim al-Hilbawi, the doyen of Egyptian lawyers, had damned himself in nationalist eyes by conducting the prosecution at Dinshaway; now he partially redeemed himself with a ringing defense of Wardani as a patriot. Despite Hilbawi's efforts, Wardani was hanged.

Watanist leader Muhammad Farid, who knew Wardani personally, dissociated himself from the deed, and the tightly controlled Arabic press condemned it almost unanimously. In the schools, shops, and streets, however, pictures of Wardani passed from hand to hand, and songs and poems celebrated "The Mussulman hero who has killed the accursed Christian."[7]

Two years later the police forestalled a plot to assassinate Khedive 'Abbas II, Prime Minister Muhammad Sa'id, and Consul-General Lord Kitchener.[8] An Egyptian naval cadet tried to kill 'Abbas II's successor, Sultan Husayn Kamil, in 1915. The British were in no mood to tolerate dissent in Egypt during World War I, and their crackdown on nationalists in 1915 brought these early assassination attempts to an end.

The First Major Wave of Assassinations, 1919-1924

The first real wave of assassination, far more intense than the earlier incidents, began in the wake of the nationalist uprising of 1919 and ended in 1924 with the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, sirdar of the Egyptian Army and governor-general of the Sudan.[9] The arrest of Sa'd Zaghlul, the leader of the delegation ("wafd," whence the name of the political party) which approached the British with Egyptian nationalist demands, triggered the uprising in March 1919. Pent-up frustrations from the war years came tumbling out in a flurry of demonstrations, strikes, and attacks on foreigners. British sources estimate some 800 Egyptians, 29 British troops, and 31 other Europeans were killed between March and July 1919, the result of the insurrection and its repression rather than assassination.[10] In the meantime, the Wafd had shouldered the Watani Party aside as the main nationalist movement.

With public order shakily restored during the summer, youths wielding bombs and pistols began to attack British soldiers and civilians. The line between assassination - with specific individuals picked out as victims - and random attacks on any Briton is a fine one. Egyptian politicians thought to be collaborating with the

[7] Graham note of 30 May 1910, enclosed in FO371/890/20791, Gorst to Grey, 4 June 1910.

[8] "A List About the Political Crimes which Took Place Between 1910 and 1925," enclosed in FO371/45919/J1061, Killearn to Eden, lists this and the other incidents of those years. It does not list a 1914 attempt on 'Abbas since it took place outside Egypt. For this incident, see Ahmad Shafiq, *Mudhakkirati fi Nisf Qarn* (Cairo, 1936), II, 346-349.

[9] Mustafa Amin, *al-Kitab al-Mamnu'* (2 vols., Cairo, 1974-1975), is devoted entirely to the 1919-1924 assassinations and the politics associated with them. Amin used many unpublished reminiscences of participants. Diffuse (nearly a thousand pages long), sensationalist, and speculative, it is nevertheless indispensible.

[10] 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Thawrat 1919* (Cairo, 1946), I, 173.

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British also became targets. The wave of assassination reached a peak in late 1919 and 1920, tapered off in 1921, then crested again in 1922 and early 1923. It then subsided until two isolated and rather different incidents occurred in 1924.

The 1910-1915 incidents had been the work of Watanists, but the secret apparatus of the Wafd carried out nearly all the attempted assassinations between 1919 and 1923. The Wafd branded as traitors Egyptians who assumed cabinet office at a time when it was trying to force the British to recognize it as the sole legitimate spokesman for the country. Four prime ministers were among the targets of these attacks; ironically four future prime ministers (one of whom was Zaghlul) were among the organizers of this violence.[11]

Unknown to his fellow Wafdists lobbying in Paris or to other members of the Wafd's central committee, Zaghul set up a secret apparatus in 1919 with ex-army officer 'Abd al-Rahman Fahmi at its head. Although Zaghul's unpublished memoirs and his secret correspondence with Fahmi include no authorizations for assassination - such orders are rarely put in writing - Zaghlul did not object when Fahmi informed him of assassination attempts and praised the patriotism and courage of a would-be assassin.[12]

The trial of Fahmi and twenty-seven others between July and October 1920 on charges of plotting to kill Sultan Fu'ad and various ministers failed to uncover the vital links of the Wafd's secret apparatus.[13] Fahmi received a death sentence which was commuted to fifteen years at hard labor.

The campaign of violence would doubtless have continued without Fahmi had Zaghlul not called it off. He publicly denounced the last assassination attempt of 1920 - that on Prime Minister Tawfiq Nasim in June[14] - about the time he began negotiations with Lord Milner. The Foreign Office fostered the conciliatory mood with a telegram instructing Lord Allenby in Egypt to discontinue investigations that might implicate prominent Wafdists in terrorist activities.[15]

After a lull of more than a year, the violence resumed late in 1921. The British had despaired of reaching a settlement with Zaghlul and saw his presence in Egypt as an obstacle to negotiating with the non-Wafdists, whom they labelled "moderates." They arrested him in December 1921 and detained him for fifteen months in Aden, the Seychelles, and Gibraltar. Between November 1921 and Zaghlul's release in the spring of 1923, eight Britons, a Greek, and an Egyptian died in a score of attacks on Britons. The deaths of Professor Robson and several others qualify as assassinations in that the killers picked out their victims individually.[16]

[11] The intended victims were Muhammad Sa'id, Yusuf Wahba, Tawfiq Nasim, and 'Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat. The future prime ministers were Sa'd Zaghlul, Ahmad Mahir, Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi, and Ibrahim 'Abd al-Hadi.

[12] 'Abd al-'Azim Ramadan, *Tatawwur al-Harakat al-Wataniyya fi Misr min Sanat 1918 ila Sanat 1936* (Cairo, n.d.), 163-164. The Fahmi-Zaghlul correspondence has been published by Muhammad Anis in *Dirasat fi Watha'iq Thawrat 1919*, Vol. I: *al-Murasalat al-Sirriya bayna Sa'd Zaghlul wa 'Abd al-Rahman Fahmi* (Cairo, 1963).

[13] Much of the correspondence in FO 371/4985-4989 (1920) pertains to the Fahmi trial.

[14] FO371/4985/E6371, Allenby to FO, 12 June 1920.

[15] FO371/4988/E13100, Curzon to Allenby, 27 November 1920.

[16] 'Anayat, *Kifah*, 50-51, 80-82.

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There were also attacks on Egyptians, including an abortive attempt on 'Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat. He had a hand in Britain's unilateral and much circumscribed declaration of independence in February 1922 and became prime minister shortly thereafter. More shocking - because it was successful and because it was an accident - was the killing of Liberal Constitutionalist politicians Hasan 'Abd al-Raziq and Isma'il Zuhdi in November 1922. They were shot by mistake for ex-prime minister Husayn Rushdi, then chairing a constitution-drafting committee which the Wafd was boycotting, and ex-prime minister 'Adli Yakan, who headed the new Liberal Constitutionalist Party in opposing the Wafd.[17]

In July 1923 the courts sentenced twelve men for attacks on Britons and on government witnesses who had testified in earlier trials. Three were hanged. But once again it was the opening of political opportunities for the Wafd rather than repression alone which dampened the violence. The British released Zaghlul from Gibraltar in April 1923, and the new Egyptian constitution was proclaimed the same month. With the prospect of a Wafdist electoral victory, the rest of 1923 was quiet. Zaghlul formed the first Wafdist government in January 1924. Among his first acts was the release of Fahmi and others serving time for political crimes.

It turned out to be false dawn for the Wafd, for Zaghlul and the British proved unable to negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement. Meanwhile an Egyptian medical student tried to kill Prime Minister Zaghlul on 12 July 1924. The Watanist assailant said he had intended to prevent Zaghlul from selling out to the British. He was judged deranged and hustled off to a mental hospital, but the suspicion lingered that King Fu'ad, who hated both Zaghlul and the parliamentary government that Zaghlul headed, might have been behind the attack.[18] Zaghlul's negotiations with Prime Minister MacDonald broke down in October, and on 16 November 1924, a volley of shots gunned down Sir Lee Stack as he passed in his car.[19]

Police informer Najib al-Hilbawi soon led the police to Stack's killers. Back in 1915 Hilbawi had received a death sentence for throwing a bomb at the sultan. His sentence was commuted to life at hard labor even though he refused to implicate any confederates, and Hilbawi "went through with it. From being a student in the School of Law he found himself for the rest of his normal life cutting stones in the convict quarries of Tura. Even after ten years of this hell he would not give an inch or say a word."[20] Amnestied by Zaghlul in 1924, Hilbawi turned informer because he felt abandoned by those who had incited his deed. Some of them now enjoyed high office in the Wafdist government, while he was in the streets.

Lawyer Shafiq Mansur was the experienced veteran in the cell of students and workmen who killed Stack. He had been detained in the

[17] Amin, *Kitab*, I, 124-127, and 'Anayat, *Kifah*, 71-73.

[18] Amin, *Kitab*, I, 420-426.

[19] The whole volume FO371/10898 (1925) Concerns the trial of the Stack case. Amin devotes the second volume of *al-Kitab al-Mamnu'* to the Stack affair and its ramifications. For an evaluation of Amin's arguments, see Ramadan, *Tatawwur*, 498-501. Biographical information on Mansur comes from his confession cited above (FO371/10899/J2008, 6 July 1925) and the records of educational missions to Europe in the Egyptian National Archives (Dar al-Watha'iq al-Qawmiyya), Milaffat al-Ba'athat, 1314.

[20] Report by Russell Pasha, Commandant, Cairo City Police, p. 2. Enclosed in FO371/10897/J746, Allenby to Chamberlain, 1 March 1925.

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Ghali case for belonging to Wardani's secret society and had been expelled from the law school. He finished his law degree in Paris, but rearrests disrupted his attempts to establish himself in law practice. He was one of the Watanists exiled to Malta in 1915 for the duration of the war. One of Mansur's confederates, Mahmud 'Anayat, died shortly after his release from prison for illness in 1917. On a condolence visit to the family after the war, Mansur met Mahmud's younger brothers 'Abd al-Fattah and 'Abd al-Hamid. Like the young Lenin, they were ready to take up the cause where a martyred brother had left off.

Ibrahim al-Hilbawi defended Shafiq Mansur in court as he had Wardani, but he could not save him from the gallows. Six others were also hanged. By turning state's evidence, 'Abd al-Fattah 'Anayat lived to write the memoirs quoted at the beginning of this article.

Britain seized on Stack's killing as the occasion for a crackdown which was already in the making. Lord Allenby's ultimatum to the Egyptian government demanded an apology, an indemnity of £500,000 to the British government, the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from the Sudan, an extension of Nile-irrigated lands in the Sudan, and the retention of British powers for protecting foreigners in Egypt. Zaghlul's cabinet gave way to Ziwar's reactionary palace government, which acquiesced in these demands.

The British eagerly tried to trace responsibility for Stack's assassination up to Ahmad Mahir and Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi (minister of education and deputy minister of interior, respectively, in Zaghlul's government) and perhaps to Zaghlul himself. Mahir, Nuqrashi, and three others were brought to trial in the spring of 1926.[21] Mahir had actually commanded the secret apparatus earlier and Nuqrashi had been active in it, so the Wafd pulled out all the stops in their defense. The executed Shafiq Mansur had implicated the two, but Wafdist lawyers argued that he had done this in a vain attempt to save his own life. The two Egyptian judges outvoted the single English judge on the court. Mahir and Nuqrashi were acquitted, but the English judge (Kershaw) resigned in protest and his government disavowed the verdict. For the next ten years British officials squirmed uncomfortably whenever political necessity forced them to deal with Mahir and Nuqrashi.[22]

It seems unlikely that Zaghlul himself had anything to do with the assassination that drove his government from office. Mahir and Nuqrashi, who were holding influential government posts, likewise stood to lose. It is unlikely, but not impossible, that they took the breakdown of negotiations with the British as a signal for resuming the violence they had organized earlier. Mustafa Amin's contention that British intelligence itself was behind the plot in order to provide an excuse for suppressing the Wafd is too involuted to be convincing. More likely Shafiq Mansur, who had both Watanist and Wafdist affiliations, resented his failure to find a post in Zaghlul's government and undertook the assassination as a blow at the Wafd as well as the British. A final answer remains elusive.

If political unrest were our topic, the 1930s would constitute a period of disturbances comparable to the pre-1914 years and the

[21] Much of the material in FO371/11597-11599 (1926) concerns this trial. For an Egyptian assessment, see Amin, *Kifah*, II, 283-328.

[22] For example, FO371/16109/J1716, Loraine to Simon, 10 June 1932.

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early 1920s. The world-wide depression struck Egypt, the problem of independence remained unresolved, youth gangs fought each other in the streets, and the struggle in press and parliament continued unabated. Three attempts were indeed made on the life of Prime Minister Isma'il Sidqi in the early 1930s, but in at least two cases his assailants were deranged and efforts to pin the blame on his Wafdist enemies failed. The bombs which exploded at British establishments and the houses of Egyptian ministers between 1931 and 1934 were designed to frighten rather than to kill.[23]

One other assassination attempt rounds out the story for the 1930s - 'Izz al-Din 'Abd al-Qadir's attack on Prime Minister Nahhas in November 1937 for allegedly betraying Egypt by signing the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. 'Abd al-Qadir was a Green Shirt militant from Ahmad Husayn's Young Egypt (*Misr al-Fatat*). Two years earlier Husayn had called for the assassination of Prime Minister Nasim and for attacks on police officers.[24] 'Abd al-Qadir was a grandson of Ahmad 'Urabi, the hero of Egypt's futile attempt to ward off Western encroachment in 1881-1882. Nahhas seized the occasion for rounding up Young Egypt's activists, but his cabinet, at odds with young King Faruq, fell a few weeks later. Ahmad Husayn defended 'Abd al-Qadir in court, arguing that the deed stemmed from patriotic motives and affection for the king. With Nahhas already out of power, the result was a lenient ten-year sentence.

The Second Wave of Assassinations, 1945-1949

British wartime security temporarily ended Egyptian political protest in 1941-1942, as it had in 1915. This time, however, the British found a local ally. They brought the Wafd back to power at a critical juncture in the war by surrounding King Faruq's palace with tanks. The price for the ensuing tranquility was high, for the British, the Wafd, and for Egypt. The Wafd had tarnished its nationalist credentials, and its cabinet fell in 1944 as soon as the British allowed King Faruq to move against it. Despair engulfed the country after the war as Faruq appointed one reactionary minority government after another. Social reform came to a standstill, and British troops remained in the Canal zone.

The second wave of assassination - far more intense than the first - broke loose in 1945 and continued into 1949.[25] Its victims included prime ministers Ahmad Mahir and Nuqrashi, ex-minister Amin 'Uthman, a prominent judge, and Hasan al-Banna' of the Muslim Brotherhood. Random violence against Britons and later against Jews provided the backdrop, but it was Egyptian Muslims who were singled out as targets for assassination. Muslim Brothers were the most active in this wave, but Young Egyptians, Watanists, Free Officers, and the palace's Iron Guard also joined the fray.

[23] 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Fi A'qab al-Thawra al-Misriyya* (Cairo, ca. 1949), II, 129-130, 154-155, lists these incidents. Russell in his *Egyptian Service* does not include them in his discussion of political crimes.

[24] P. J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and his Generation* (New York, 1978), 31. 'Izz al-Din 'Abd al-Qadir's (also called Muhammad Tawfiq 'Abd al-Qadir) account of the assassination attempt is found in *al-Liwa' al-Jadid*, No. 45, 5 December 1945, 10-11, and No. 46, 5 December (misprint for 12 December) 1945, 18-19. Professor James Jankowski kindly pointed these articles out to me and supplied me with copies of them.

[25] For a sketch of the events of this wave and the other violence accompanying it, see Rafi'i, *A'qab*, III, 151-153, 262-272, 279-280.

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The killing of Lord Moyne, British minister for the Middle East, in Cairo in November 1944 provided a prelude.[26] The deed belongs to British imperial and Jewish history more than to Egyptian history, for the two young assassins were members of the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (known to the British as the Stern Gang). Abraham Stern's followers had refused to join mainstream Zionists in suspending their struggle against British authorities in Palestine for the duration of World War II. Moyne's self-confessed killers boldly used their trial to proclaim their national cause.

Their example was not lost on Egyptians. The assassins' court-appointed Egyptian lawyers described the centuries of Jewish persecution and portrayed their clients as patriots struggling to free their land from British imperialist invaders.[27] Captain Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir (Nasser) reportedly commented, "Here were men ready to die for their cause, who hold an example to us."[28] When Prime Minister Ahmad Mahir was killed in February 1945, British Ambassador Lord Killearn urged his successor Nuqrashi to speed up the execution of Moyne's assassins as a deterrent to such deeds.[29] They were hanged in March.

Ahmad Mahir's violent past had come back to haunt him. A young lawyer named Mahmud 'Issawi shot him down as he crossed from the Chamber of Deputies to the Senate to repeat a call for an Egyptian declaration of war on Germany and Japan. The declaration would make Egypt eligible for membership in the United Nations, but to 'Issawi it was treasonable truckling to the British. 'Issawi had been released from wartime detention - by Mahir himself according to some reports - not long before. He belonged to the wing of the Watanists under Fathi Radwan which had recently seceded from Young Egypt. Dr. Hasan Nur al-Din, one of those detained in the Ghali case thirty-five years before, reportedly encouraged 'Issawi, sheltered him, and supplied him with the murder weapon.[30] Before he was hanged in September 1945, 'Issawi had confessed only to being a Watanist, but some - including the revolutionary government after 1952 - suspected the Muslim Brotherhood.[31]

Meanwhile a band of young extremists around Hasayn Tawfiq had been shooting at British soldiers in Maadi on and off since 1942, "limbering up," as Tawfiq's later confederate Anwar al-Sadat put it, "for the main task of removing the men who had supported the British - those led by Mustafa al-Nahas."[32] Sadat spent two years in jail after being caught plotting with German spies as Rommel approached Alexandria. In the fall of 1945 Sadat began supplying Husayn Tawfiq's group with stolen arms and training them in their use.

[26] Michael J. Cohen, "The Moyne Assassination, November 9, 1944: A Political Analysis," *Middle Eastern Studies*, XV (1979), 358-373.

[27] Edward Hyams, *Killing No Murder: A Study of Assassination as a Political Means* (London, 1969), 189-194.

[28] Jean Lacouture, *Nasser: A Biography*, trans. Daniel Hofstadter (New York, 1973), 365.

[29] FO371/45918/J803, Killearn to FO, 27 February 1945.

[30] 'Abd al-'Aziz Khamis, "Asrar al-Kifah al-Sirri," *Rus al-Yusuf*, No. 2555 (30 May 1977), 14-15.

[31] Anwar El Sadat, *Revolt on the Nile* (New York, 1957), 64, for example, flatly states that the killer was a Muslim Brother. See also Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London, 1969), 33-34.

[32] Sadat, *Search*, 58.

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Sadat participated in the attempt on Nahhas on 6 December 1945, when Husayn Tawfiq threw a grenade at his car. It exploded a few seconds too late, and the assailants got away.[33]

Tawfiq's next target was Amin 'Uthman, the main link between Nahhas and the British Embassy. Educated at Victoria College in Alexandria and in Oxford and London, and married to an Englishwoman, this "blue eyed boy of the [British] Embassy"[34] was almost more English than the English themselves. Amin went so far as to pronounce the Anglo-Egyptian relationship "a Catholic marriage" and therefore indissoluble. "That declaration," says Sadat, "was tantamount to a self-imposed death sentence. On January 6, 1946, the sentence was carried out."[35] Husayn Tawfiq shot 'Uthman and made good his escape by throwing one of Sadat's grenades to delay his pursuers. When he was later captured, his confession implicated Sadat and many others.

King Faruq had meanwhile formed his shadowy Iron Guard, mostly made up of army officers, which he used for personal and political vendettas. Captain Mustafa Kamil Sidqi led the Guard, to which the Free Officers had some links. One source attributes Husayn Tawfiq's killing of Amin 'Uthman, as well as two attempts on Nahhas, to the Iron Guard acting on the king's orders.[36]

The year between March 1948 and February 1949 brought not only Egypt's humiliating defeat by the new state of Israel but also the climax of the second wave of assassination. Above all it was the year of the Muslim Brothers.[37] The Brothers' secret apparatus had been engaged in violence for some time before two Brothers killed Judge Ahmad al-Khazindar in March 1948. Khazindar had sentenced a Brother for a bombing attack on a British officer's club. Khazindar's death sent a chill through the judiciary and the government, making them more leary than ever of confronting the popular Brotherhood.

By April 1948 the much-delayed trial of Husayn Tawfiq, Sadat, and others accused in the Amin 'Uthman case was finally under way, with defense lawyers lionizing their clients.[38] *Ruz al-Yusuf* ran articles entitled "Was Amin 'Uthman a Traitor?" and "When Will a Pardon Be Issued for Husayn Tawfiq?"[39] "All our leaders today," declared the magazine as it pointed to Ahmad Mahir, Nuqrashi, and Ibrahim 'Abd al-Hadi, began with political crimes, which are a recognized feature of revolutions. Was it any wonder that on 25

[33] *Ibid.* Sadat incorrectly puts the date as 6 September. Another participant's account is Wasim Khalid, *al-Kifah al-Sirri didda al-Injliz: Mudhakkirat Wasim Khalid* (cairo, n.d.; c. 1963), 119-122.

[34] The phrase is Russell Pasha's. Quoted in Vatikiotis, *Nasser*, 121, 124, n.20. Details of 'Amin Uthman's career are found in his pension folder in the archives of the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, Dar al-Mahfuzat, Milaffat al-Khidma 100/3/5210/54356 (1946).

[35] Sadat, *Search*, 59.

[36] Murtada al-Maraghi, *Akhir Sa'a*, No. 2228 (6 July 1977), 12-14. The Iron Guard is also mentioned briefly in Sadat, *Revolt*, 86, and Vatikiotis, *Nasser*, 102-103.

[37] The following account relies heavily on Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*.

[38] Lutfi 'Uthman, *al-Muhakama al-Kubra fi Qadiyyat al-Ightiyalat al-Siyasiyya* (Cairo, n.d.), is devoted entirely to the Amin 'Uthman trial. Later accounts by defendants in the case include Sadat, *Search*, 59-72, 91-92; Khamis, *Ruz al-Yusuf*, No. 2552 (9 May 1977) through No. 2558 (20 June 1977); and Khalid, *Kifah*, 135 ff.

[39] *Ruz al-Yusuf*, No. 919 (24 January 1946), 15, and No. 1061 (13 October 1948) 6.

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April 1948 a car full of dynamite wrecked the Garden City home of Nahhas Pasha?

On 15 May 1948, Egypt was swept into her disastrous war with Israel. In June, bombs began going off at Jewish businesses and residential districts of Cairo with heavy loss of life. Husayn Tawfiq escaped - or was allowed to escape - to Jordan and Syria. He enhanced his heroic image by sending word that he was on his way to fight Zionists in Palestine.[40] Seventy-two percent of the respondents to a *Ruz al-Yusef* poll said they would not turn him in if he took refuge with them.[41] Tawfiq was sentenced *in absentia* that October for a mere ten years; Sadat was among those acquitted altogether.

In November two of Nahhas's bodyguards died when an armored car opened fire on his car. The assassins of Judge Khazindar openly rejoiced when they received a life sentence at hard labor instead of death.[42] In the same month evidence found in a jeep led to the arrest of thirty-two Muslim Brothers and the first discovery of their secret apparatus.

December opened with the killing of hated Cairo police chief Salim Zaki by a bomb tossed into his car during a riot at the medical school. Long-term Cairo police chief Russell Pasha had praised Zaki back in 1925 for his role in breaking the Stack case.[43] Zaki had succeeded to Russell's post in 1946. Major A. W. Sansom, British security official, called him "the toughest, most ruthless police chief I have ever met," and went on to describe Zaki's breaking up of a massive student demonstration headed for downtown Cairo:

> Selim Zaki did not try to block the entrance to the bridge. He faced the demonstrators quite fearlessly and ordered them to stay on their own side of the river. For a moment their leaders paused, stopped by the sheer force of his personality. But they had no control over those behind, and were pushed aside as the main body of the demonstrators surged forward on to the bridge. Selim Zaki shouted a warning as they swept past, but they only laughed and jeered.
>
> "Now what?" I asked, although I knew the answer, and knew it was the only possible answer, that it had to be done. What I did not like, what really sickened me, was that this cold-blooded police chief waited until about five hundred people, mostly students, were streaming across the bridge before he gave the order for it to be opened....
>
> As an exercise in breaking up a large, dangerous mob with only a handful of police it was brilliant, and probably Selim Zaki was right in his claim that the death-toll [about forty] would have been much higher if

[40] *Ibid.*, No. 1044 (16 June 1948), 5-6.

[41] *Ibid.*, No. 1047 (7 July 1948), 12.

[42] Rafi'i, *A'qab*, III, 268.

[43] Report by Russell Pasha, p.6 enclosed in FO371/10897/J746, Allenby to Chamberlain, 1 March 1925. For one of the many earlier plots against Zaki's life, see FO371/15407/J3151, Campbell to the Marquess of Reading, 23, October 1931.

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> he had let the mob cross the bridge. But I was glad that it was not I who had had to make the decision about opening the bridge....
>
> I wondered how much longer he would remain alive....[44]

"Few tears were shed for Selim Zaki," Sansom remarked, "but his murder scared the Government out of its wits."[45] Prime Minister Nuqrashi saw no alternative but to grab the bull by the horns and outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood; twenty days later he was dead. Nuqrashi's killer, 'Abd al-Majid Ahmad Hasan, belonged to the Brotherhood's secret apparatus, but massive arrests had disrupted the chain of command and Supreme Guide Hasan al-Banna' probably had no part in the assassination.

Ibrahim 'Abd al-Hadi stepped into Nuqrashi's shoes as prime minister and pressed the campaign against the Brotherhood. After Khazindar's assassination no judge would dare preside over a trial of Banna' himself, and Banna' correctly feared that the government's failure to detain him when several thousand Brothers were being rounded up was his own death warrant. Desperately he negotiated with the government, issuing a pamphlet denouncing Nuqrashi's killing. His leader's repudiation of the deed for which he had been willing to die led Nuqrashi's assassin to make a full confession which led to further arrests.

On 13 February 1949, Banna' was shot three times in the back outside the headquarters of the Young Men's Muslim Association. After the revolution members of the political police were belatedly convicted of the killing, but higher responsibility has never been proved. Speculation centers on Nuqrashi's friend and successor 'Abd al-Hadi, who vigorously denies responsibility, and the palace.[46] Ahmad Husayn offered the usual defense of Nuqrashi's killer as a patriot but could not save him from hanging in April 1950.[47] In May 1949, Muslim Brothers hurled grenades at the car of Hamid Juda (president of the Chamber of Deputies) in the belief that it was 'Abd al-Hadi's. More arrests followed, and the second wave of assassinations came to an end.

A few months after 'Abd al-Hadi's harsh government fell in July 1949, an electoral triumph swept Nahhas - still an authentic national hero to many - and the Wafd back into office. The cabinets which followed 'Abd al-Hadi's treated the Brotherhood more gingerly, and the Brothers licked their wounds for a while. The Brothers got off lightly in the jeep case; presiding judge Ahmad Kamil was so impressed with the defendants' bearing that he later joined the Brotherhood.[48] Banna''s successor Hasan Isma'il al-Hudaybi was a respected judge who repudiated violence and attempted to dismantle the secret apparatus.

But events spun out of the control of both Hudaybi and Nahhas, and by late 1951 violence again engulfed Egypt. Nahhas tried to ride the tiger of anti-British emotions by abrogating the 1936 treaty and

[44] A. W. Sansom, *I Spied Spies* (London, 1965), 196-198.

[45] *Ibid.*, 226.

[46] Interview, Cairo (January, 1978).

[47] Vatikiotis, *Nasser*, 89-94.

[48] Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, 79.

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abetting guerilla attacks on the British in the Canal Zone, but the Cairo riots of January 1952 drove him from office. Six months later the Free Officers ousted the king and took over the government.

Two assassination attempts in the early 1950's might be considered the afterswell of the wave which ended in 1949. Nasser had generally come to believe that assassination and bombings were counterproductive. He vetoed Sadat's suggestion that they blow up the British Embassy and everyone in it, arguing the the result would be reprisals like those that followed Stack's killing.[49] But Nasser and two other Free Officers attacked the car of General Husayn Sirri 'Amr with machine guns on 9 January 1952.[50] As a crony of King Faruq's, 'Amr symbolized to the Free Officers the corruption of the old regime. Nasser immediately repented his lapse and was relieved to learn the next morning that his victim had lived.

The final incident was the Muslim Brothers' attempt on Nasser in Alexandria in October 1954. Efforts at Muslim Brotherhood - Free Officer cooperation had broken down earlier in the year. The Brothers accused Nasser of selling out to the British in his negotiations for evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone. Hudaybi went into hiding in August to avoid assassination or arrest, and Nasser avoided public appearances for a time because of threats on his life. The storm broke when a Muslim Brother from the secret apparatus, tin-smith Mahmud 'Abd al-Latif, fired eight shots at Nasser as he gave a speech.

Nasser used the incident to break up the Brotherhood. 'Abd al-Latif and five others were hanged in December. Supreme Guide Hudaybi, who had been desperately trying to dismantle the secret apparatus and who almost certainly knew nothing of the plot, received a death sentence which was commuted to life at hard labor.

Nasser's suppression of the Brotherhood and consolidation of control, combined with the renewed hopes which his charismatic personality and reformist program awakened in many Egyptians, removed the circumstances which had produced assassinations for many years to come. Under Sadat, who lacked Nasser's charisma and abandoned his populist ideology, political violence would surface once again.

The above sketch has confirmed, not surprisingly, that assassination in Egypt coincided with high levels of nationalist frustration and with political violence generally. In analyzing these events further, let us compare them with their antecedents and parallels in the Middle East and other parts of the world.

Middle Eastern Antecedents

Western writers have been quick to point out that our word "assassin" comes from Arabic and that three of the first four caliphs of Islam met violent deaths.[51] They point to the puritanical Kharijis, who seceded from the Imam 'Ali's army in 657, labelled all who rejected their views apostates, and plunged into a fury of assassination and revolt. They recall the assassins proper - the Nizari Isma'ili branch of the Shi'is who assassinated their Sunni

[49] Sadat, *Revolt*, 65.

[50] Premier Gamal Abdul Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington, D.C., 1955), 52-60, and Vatikiotis, *Nasser*, 124, n. 7.

[51] Bernard Lewis, *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam* (New York, 1968), 2-6, 126.

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Muslim foes from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. Our word "assassin" comes from their opponents' assertion that the *fadayin* (those who sacrifice themselves) who carried out these deeds were under the influence of hashish. It has yet to be established, however, that assassination was any more frequent in the Islamic world than in the Roman Empire, say, or Renaissance Europe.

In modern times government opponents of the Muslim Brothers tried to find Khariji and Nizari roots (with their implication of heresy to Sunni Egyptians) for the Brotherhood's tactics. Rumor had it that a plot for the triple assasination of Khedive 'Abbas II, Prime Minister Muhammad Sa'id, and Consul-General Lord Kitchener in 1912 was patterned on the Kharijis' plan to strike down 'Ali, Mu'awiya, and 'Amr ibn al-'As on the same day.[52] An Egyptian militant of the 1940s recalls reading up on the techniques of the Kharijis and such Shi'i groups as the Qarmatians.[53]

Ottoman antecedents are closer in time to the Egyptian case, but assassination in the Ottoman Empire has attracted the purveyors of stories of harem intrigue more than serious scholars. The attempt to prevent potential challenges to the reigning sultan by executing his brothers is well-known, as are the later depositions and occasional murders of Ottoman sultans by Janissaries and palace factions. Assassination by palace intrigue continued in Istanbul and Cairo in the nineteenth century. Selim III was killed for political reasons in 1807, as was Midhat Pasha in 1884, and perhaps Sultan Abdulaziz in 1876. In Egypt 'Abbas I was killed in 1854 and Khedive Isma'il apparently did in his ertswhile favorite Isma'il al-Saddiq in the 1870s. In the twentieth century, Hasan al-Banna''s killing probably fits the "palace intrigue" tradition. It was widely believed, although it would be difficult to document, that King Fu'ad and King Faruq had various personal and political opponents killed.[54]

Despite the lingering tradition of "palace intrigue" assassinations, most of the killings studied here are different. They were not simply personal power struggles within the ruling elite. Their perpetrators were often obscure men driven by Egyptian patriotism or Islamic enthusiasm. They rarely knew their victims personnally, and sometimes they acted on their own. Such deeds belong to the age of Western imperialism and indigenous nationalist response. The killing of General Kléber, commander of the French expedition to Egypt after Napoleon's departure, is more truly a forerunner of twentieth-century Egyptian assassinations. The assassin was a Syrian, Sulayman al-Halabi, who had come to Egypt at the instigation of Ottoman officials in Palestine to kill this representative of the Christian world's onslaught on Islamic lands.[55]

[52] *The Egyptian Gazette* (3 July 1912), 3.

[53] Khalid, *Kifah*, 81.

[54] Jamal Salim, *al-Bulis al-Siyasi Yahkumu Misr 1910-1952* (Cairo, 1975), provides a spotty popular account of the doings of the political police.

[55] J. Christopher Herold, *Bonaparte in Egypt* (New York, 1962), 362,365-368. Al-Jabarti gives a full acount of the incident in his *'Aja'ib al-Athar* (4 vols., Cairo, (1880). The 'Anayats read of Kléber's assassination in a patriotic book by Mustafa Kamil shortly before they founded their own cell. Anayat, *Kifah*, 41.

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International Comparisons and Influences

To Westerners who nod knowingly when terrorism is mentioned in connection with the Middle East, it may come as a surprise that some Egyptians, shocked by Wardani's assassination of Butrus Ghali, considered the deed un-Egyptian and un-Islamic. They blamed it on ideas that Wardani had picked up during the two years he had spent studying in Europe.[56] "We have only acquired the faults of the Europeans. Instead of assimilating their good qualities, we imitate the example of their anarchists and apaches." "It was not the spirit of Egypt which carried the assassin's bullet into the heart of his distinguished victim but the foreign spirit of revolution which the murderer has acquired in Europe during his residence there."[57]

Ghali's killing came near the end of the 1870-1914 era which one writer has dubbed "the golden age" of assassination in the West.[58] In Europe and the United States, four kings, four prime ministers, three presidents, two crown princes, and two queens were assassinated during those years. The Socialist Revolutionaries of Russia left a particularly bloody mark during this period. These outbursts were a product of the age of nationalism and democracy.[59] Nationalists struck against foreign rulers and their local collaborators, democratic-minded socialists and anarchists against representatives of the ruling classes.

One world-wide study of assassination attempts between 1918 and 1968 found that 70 percent of the incidents fell into four periods: (1) 1919-1923, (2) 1932-1934, (3) 1946-1951, and (4) 1963-1966.[60] The first and third periods coincide almost exactly with the two major waves of assassination in Egypt. This is probably more than coincidence. These periods followed the two world wars, during which repressive governments and the unprecedented outlets for state-sponsored violence probably account for the paucity of assassinations. After the wars, assassinations picked up as political controls were relaxed, surplus arms became widely available, and soldiers trained to kill went home. In the Third World, nationalist struggles for independence heated up after the two wars. The authors think that the Depression may be the main cause of their second period - 1932-1934. We have seen that Egypt was restless then too, even though she did not express this mainly through assassination. Only the last period - 1963-1966 - runs counter to the Egyptian pattern; Nasser's combination of repression and personal charisma kept political discontent from surfacing much until after the disastrous 1967 war. An Indian specialist has found four periods of "terrorism" centered in Bengal up to World War II: 1906-1914, 1915-1917, 1919-1925, and 1929-1934.[61] His study is not strictly comparable to ours, for his definition of terrorism carries him well beyond our definition of

[56] *al-Mu'ayyad* (10 February 1910), as quoted in Seikaly, *Middle Eastern Studies*, XIII, (1977) 121.

[57] *al-Mu'ayyad* and *al-Ahram*, as quoted in *The Egyptian Gazette* (24 February 1910), 3, and (22 February 1910), 3.

[58] Hyams, *Killing*, 2. The following death toll is also figured from Hyams.

[59] Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism* (Boston, 1977), 11.

[60] Havens, *Assassination*, 27-28.

[61] David M. Laushey, *Bengal Terrorism and the Marxist Left: Aspects of Regional Nationalism in India, 1905-1942* (Calcutta, 1975).

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assassination. Nevertheless it may be significant that his third period coincides with our postwar wave of Egyptian assassinations and that his first two and his fourth periods overlap roughly with the scattered assassination attempts in Egypt.

Did Indian violence influence violence in Egypt and vice versa, or was it a matter of parallel nationalist responses to similar rhythms under the same colonial ruler? British administrators from Lord Cromer down brought with them to Egypt attitudes and techniques of rule acquired in India. They also brought a fear of Western-style schools as a breeding-ground for nationalism. The reverse phenomenon of Indian nationalists influencing Egyptians was less intense but not insignificant. When Wardani killed Ghali, the British-run *Egyptian Gazette* commented:

> Hitherto political assassination has been unknown in Egypt. Princes and Ministers have been murdered in various approved Oriental fashions, but the form of crime, of which Butrus Pasha Ghali was the victim, is without precedent in modern Egypt. But of late the Anglophone native journals have made a speciality of setting before their readers every detail they could get about the unrest in India. The assassinations of officials were gloated over and when Sir Curzon Whylie was murdered in London last summer, "al Lewa," the official organ of the Nationalist Party [the Watani Party to which Wardani belonged] published a poem glorifying Dhingra, his murderer.[62]

Once Wardani had shown the way the Egyptian assassination movement proceeded under its own steam, but it did receive occasional stimulation from outside the Middle East. Free Officer 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, for example, wanted Egyptians to emulate the Japanese army officers whose secret organization in the 1930s had killed politicians they opposed.[63]

Closer to home, the Armenian tragedy provoked a flurry of assassinations of exiled Young Turk leaders in the early 1920s: Talat Pasha, Jemal Pasha, and ex-Grand Vizier Mehmed Said Halim were among the victims. The fact that these men had already fallen from power lessened the impact of their assassinations, however, and Egyptians - unlike Armenians and Turks - do not seem to have taken much note of the news.

The example of Pan-Islamic activist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani made a deeper impression on Egyptians. Afghani had left behind a circle of disciples when he was expelled from Egypt in the 1870s. A follower of his shot and killed - almost certainly at his master's instigation - the shah of Persia in 1896. Half a century later, the Muslim Brothers looked back to al-Afghani as a forerunner of their movement.[64]

A cursory glance at assassinations in Egypt's Fertile Crescent neighbors suggests that they were out of cycle with Egyptian patterns, although the subject awaits a careful investigation. Egypt had come under colonial rule thirty-five years earlier; she was

[62] *The Egyptian Gazette* (21 February 1910), 3.

[63] 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakkirat 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi* (Cairo, 1977), I, 20.

[64] Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, 321-322.

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already using assassination as part of her independence struggle at the time when the Ottomans still ruled the Fertile Crescent. In the disturbances of 1919-1920 the Egyptians were revolting against entrenched colonial rule, whereas the Iraqis, the Syrians, and the Palestinian Arabs were resisting attempts to fasten the colonial yoke on them for the first time. Nothing in the Fertile Crescent really parallels the Egyptian assassination wave of 1919-1924; resistance to colonial rule in the interwar Fertile Crescent did not usually take the form of assassination. The inter-Arab assassinations during the Arab revolt in Palestine (1936-1939) may be partial exceptions, although it is difficult here to sort out politically-motivated killings from family feuds. The Iraqi assassinations of the late 1930s - Bakr Sidqi and Jamil al-Midfa'i were among the victims - were part of an internal power struggle and came after Britain had stepped into the background.

Like Egypt, the countries of Southwest Asia did experience numerous assassinations after World War II. A world-wide study of assassination between 1948 and 1967 found that the Middle East had the largest number of assassinations and attempts per country.[65] Imam Yahya and three of his sons died in a coup attempt in 1948, the same year that Israeli extremists killed U.N. mediator Count Folke Bernadotte. In 1951 assassins eliminated King 'Abdallah of Jordan, ex-Prime Minister Riyad al-Sulh of Lebanon, and Prime Minister 'Ali Razmara of Iran. King Faysal II, Crown Prince 'Abd al-Ilah, and Nuri al-Sa'id died at the hands of Iraqi mobs in 1958. Assassins killed Iraqi President Qasim in the coup of 1963, Jordanian Prime Minister Hazza' al-Majali in 1960, and Syrian ex-President Shishakli in his Brazilian refuge in 1964. In contrast to Egypt - where the postwar assassinations had begun before the end of World War II - the assassinations of Southwest Asia effectively began only in 1948. Southwest Asian assassinations also continued through the 1950s and 1960s, a time when Egypt had quieted down internally under Nasser. The Arab-Israeli war of 1948 provides part of the explanation on the timing of Fertile Crescent assassinations. The killings of Bernadotte, 'Abdallah, and Riyad al-Sulh all grew directly out of that conflict.

Violence in Palestine also spilled over into Egypt. The British reported that Nahhas's assailant in 1937 had earned his spurs in the on-going Arab revolt in Palestine.[66] We have noted Egyptian nationalists' curious admiration for the assassins of Lord Moyne. Did they realize that the same gun that the Zionists used to kill Lord Moyne had killed two Palestinian Arabs?[67] As Egypt drifted toward war with Israel in 1948, the Muslim Brothers used the struggle to justify arming themselves and training in the Muqattam Hills; the Egyptian defeat in Palestine catalyzed the Free Officers into turning their guns on the home front. Nevertheless the Palestinian issue was not so central to Egyptian politics as to those of Jordan or Syria.

[65] Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind Feierabend, "Cross-National Comparative Study of Assassination," in Doris Y. Wilkinson, ed., *Social Structure and Assassination Behavior: The Sociology of Political Murder* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), 167.

[66] FO371/20888/J5140, Lampson to Wauchope, 1 December 1937.

[67] J. Bowyer Bell, *Assassin!* (New York, 1979), 243-244.

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The Social Background and Political Motivations of Egyptian Assassins

A study of terrorists from eleven countries between 1966 and 1976 draws a composite profile of the "average terrorist" as being aged 22-25, unmarried, familiar with the urban terrain, of middle or upper middle class background, and with some university education.[68] Table 2 on Egyptian assassins and Table 3 on all the defendants in the Amin 'Uthman case (below) show a similar picture. Most were in their late teens or early twenties. Many came from middle-class backgrounds, and nine were even the sons of pashas or beys. The "unknowns" among the 'Uthman case defendants probably did spring from humbler origins.

Most Egyptian assassins had studied in government schools - and thus had had some exposure to Western thought - rather than in the religious system capped by al-Azhar. Wardani, Shafiq Mansur, and 'Abd al-Khaliq had studied in Europe itself. Students stand out in both tables, with many of the rest coming from the lower rungs of bureaucratic or professional careers. There were also some workingmen sprinkled among the white-collar *effendis*.

Women had plotted in palace assassinations in Ottoman times, but no women appear on these lists. Most of these assassinations were public ones, and Egyptian women were only beginning to enter public life during the first half of the twentieth century.

Butrus Ghali was a Copt and his killing by a Muslim inflamed religious tensions. One of the would-be assassins was also a Copt, for Copts stood out in the Wafd and in the nationalist movement. Coptic medical student 'Iryan Yusuf Sa'd was chosen to attack Coptic Prime Minister Yusuf Wahba to avoid the charges of Muslim fanaticism which followed Ghali's killing.[69] Four defendants in the 'Abd al-Rahman Fahmi consipiracy trial were also Copts.[70]

Egyptian assassins did not show the democratic motivations (in either their anarchist and revolutionary socialist forms) that often drove their Western counterparts. As one would expect in a colonial context, assassins in Egypt heeded the calls of nationalism or religion, or some mixture of the two. The English were obvious targets:

> The English have done unthinkable things in our country, and persecuted us in a most hideous way - even to the extent of permitting themselves to slay women and children.... This is what has driven us to inaugurate an age of terrorism in Egypt, so that we could show the English that there were, among the Egyptian people, men who did not fear death in the cause of upholding their dignity. Our idea was to do to the English what they had done to us; a revolutionary society was formed, to pursue terrorist activity from which the Angel of Death would never be absent.[71]

[68] Charles A. Russell and Bowman H. Miller, Capt., "Profile of a Terrorist," *Terrorism*, I (1977), 17-34.

[69] Amin, *Kitab*, I, 123-124, 133-136.

[70] Calculated from the list in Rafi'i, *Thawrat*, II, 68-69.

[71] "The Diary of Abdel Fattah Inayat," p. 1, translated from *al-Hawadith* (16 April 1947), and enclosed in FO371/62991/J2390, Campbell to Bevin, 19 May 1947.

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Among Egyptian targets, nationalist assassins picked out not only such obvious collaborators as Butrus Ghali, Sultan Husayn Kamil, and 'Uthman Amin, but also nationalist heroes whom they believed had betrayed the cause - Zaghlul, Nahhas, Ahmad Mahir, Nuqrashi, 'Abd al-Hadi, and Nasser. To Sadat the fallen hero was

> Mustafa el-Nahas, head of the Wafd, who had lost our respect since the British had forced us to accept him, at gunpoint, as premier on February 4, 1942. Nothing is more painful for young men than to be disillusioned in a leader who was once their idol. When we were schoolboys we had gone out twice a day to have a look at el-Nahas (cheering and applauding) as he rode down to work and back. He had been a mythical hero - a peerless symbol of patriotism, self-sacrifice, and devotion. On the Fourth of February he lost everything and we came to regard him as a traitor. His disloyalty to Egypt and her people made his removal a national duty. We therefore decided to get rid of him.[72]

Religiously motivated assassination attempts on Nuqrashi, Khazindar, 'Abd al-Hadi, and Nasser came from Muslim Brothers. Anti-British nationalism also permeated the Brothers, but their religious world-view led them to speak more of their victims' betrayal of Islam than of the Egyptian nation as such.

'Abd al-Fattah 'Anayat describes the longing for immortality which all the assassins presumably felt:

> Reaching mental maturity in my seventeenth year, my eyes were opened to a world aflame with revolution. I discovered that the universe was inevitably destined to annihilation, and that man can only be remembered after death by whatever great deeds he may perform during his lifetime.[73]

A sense of failure and despair dogged some assassins. The press reported that Wardani had terminal tuberculosis and had never actually graduated as a pharmacist, that Mahmud Mazhar had been jilted by his Jewish girlfriend, and that Mahmud 'Issawi's father had divorced his mother and squandered his modest wealth. Shafiq Mansur's expulsion from the Cairo law school shortly before he would have graduated was the first of many frustrations in his attempt to pursue a lawyer's career. He also failed to get a suitable post when Zaghlul came to power in 1924. Hasan 'Abd al-Hafiz had flunked out of secondary school and 'Abd al-Hamid Ahmad Hasan had been expelled from veterinary school.

Such portraits of assassins as frustrated failures must be taken with caution, for people who deplore assassination seem to have a psychological need to portray assassins in such terms. (They also label assassins "cowardly," which seems most inappropriate no matter how strongly one abhors their deeds). Ahmad Mahir, Nuqrashi, and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i were well launched on professional careers at the time they began organizing assassinations. As the son of a

[72] Sadat, *Search*, 58.

[73] "Diary of Abdel Fattah Inayat," FO371/62991/J2390, Campbell to Bevin, 19 May 1947.

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pasha and prominent official, Husayn Tawfiq seemed to be throwing a promising conventional future to the winds in turning to violence. Luck did eventually propel Mahir, Rafi'i, Nuqrashi, 'Abd al-Hadi, Nasser, and Sadat to worldly success anyway, but they could not have counted on that as they plotted to kill political leaders.

A family legacy motivated some assassins. The 'Anayats were picking up the legacy of an elder brother who had given his life for the cause.[74] One of the defendants in the Amin 'Uthman case was the son of a detainee in the Ghali case thirty-six years before.[75]

The assassins rarely knew their victims personally, but personal grudges occasionally entered the picture. 'Anayat hated his law professor, Robson, for his alleged arrogance, his political needling, and for lecturing in English. He also marked down for assassination a British official in the Ministry of Education where he worked as a clerk.[76]

Finally, simple self-preservation was a motive for Muslim Brothers to kill Nuqrashi and 'Abd al-Hadi when those prime ministers began waging all-out war on the Muslim Brothers.

As in the case of President John F. Kennedy, no firm consensus has emerged on the responsibility for some Egyptian assassinations. Stack's killing has been attributed to Zaghlul, to Shafiq Mansur alone, to Mahir and Nuqrashi acting without higher approval, to King Fu'ad and his agent Hasan Nash'at, and to British intelligence services eager for an excuse to crush Zaghlul.[77] Hasan al-Banna''s death has been blamed on King Faruq's Iron Guard (with or without the king's approval), Prime Minister 'Abd al-Hadi, and dissident Muslim Brothers. In the Kennedy case the U.S. government desperately wanted to assure the public that Oswald was a lone killer, not part of a conspiracy. In Egypt the government of the moment usually tried to prove a conspiracy - of Watanists, Wafdists, Young Egyptians, or Muslim Brothers - in order to have an excuse for dealing its opposition a devastating blow.

Accused Egyptian assassins faced the dilemma of admitting the deed in hopes of becoming heroes or of disavowing it in hopes of escaping punishment. When they did admit the deed, they often denied having accomplices. Interrogators in search of a conspiracy then resorted to psychological pressure and physical torture. This merely produced a bewildering mass of true, false, contradictory, and retracted confessions. Sadat believed that his false charge that he had been tortured helped produce his acquital in the Amin 'Uthman case (even though he was guilty).[78] We may never know if Mahmud 'Issawi really acted alone in killing Mahir or was bravely covering up for fellow conspirators.

[74] 'Anayat, *Kifah*, 9, 135-137.

[75] 'Uthman, *Muhakama*, 20.

[76] 'Anayat, *Kifah*, 50-53

[77] For the argument that the palace and the British intelligence service were involved, see Amin, *Kitab*, II, *passim*.

[78] Sadat, *Search*, 66-67, 72.

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The Impact of the Assassinations

One study proposes a five-point scale for rating the political impact of assassinations, according to whether they produce: (1) no discernable changes in personnel (other than succession to the victim's place), (2) personnel changes but no policy changes, (3) policy changes as well as personnel changes, (4) profound alteration of the political system, or (5) full-scale revolution.[79] No Egyptian case fits the fifth category. The Stack assassination falls somewhere between the third and fourth categories. It brought the first wave of assassination to a halt and gave the British an excuse to sweep the Wafd from power, install a palace-dominated government, and expel Egyptians from the Sudan. These changes were profound, but they were hardly permanent; less than two years later, the British reluctantly allowed the return of the Wafd to the cabinet.

Ghali's assassination perhaps falls in the third category. It finished off Consul-General Gorst's already tottering policy of conciliation and paved the way for his successor Kitchener's "no-nonsense" approach. Events were already moving that way, however, and the assassination merely speeded things up. Ghali's death also induced the British to set up a Secret Service Bureau to keep tabs on the nationalists. Its reports by-passed the minister of interior and eventually, under various names, the bureau became the palace-controlled political police.[80]

At first glance, Mahir's and Nuqrashi's assassinations seem to fit the first category, for in each case a successor from the same Sa'dist Party stepped in to continue the policies and personnel of his predecessor. Nuqrashi completed the declaration of war on the Axis powers two days after Mahir's death, and 'Abd al-Hadi continued the crackdown on the Muslim Brothers for which Nuqrashi had been killed. But the longer-range impact was deeper in each case. Mahir's assassination initiated the second wave of assassination and its associated violence, and Nuqrashi's killing triggered the shooting of Hasan al-Banna' two months later.

Like the killing of Ghali, the unsuccessful attempts on Nahhas in 1937 and Nasser in 1954 merely accelerated changes already in the works. Nahhas now had his excuse to crack down on Young Egypt, with whom he was already feuding, but his shaky government soon collapsed anyway. Nasser's showdown with the Muslim Brothers was far advanced before the assassination attempt precipitated the final break.

The killings of Judge Khazindar and Amin 'Uthman triggered no important policy or personnel changes since neither was running the government. But in each case a lesson of fear came through. 'Uthman's death warned Egyptian politicans of the dangers of friendship with the British, and Khazindar's death struck fear into judges and politicans who had to deal with the Muslim Brothers.

The creators of the five-point assassination scale place the killing of Banna' in the fourth category. They reason that by eliminating the dynamic leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and decimating his organizatin, the government eliminated the possibility - perhaps even the probability - of revolution from the religious right. They argue that this bought the old regime several more years of life and

[79] Havens, *Assassination*, 98.

[80] Salim, *Bulis*, 35.

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ensured that when the revolution came, it came from the left (or at most the center) rather than from the right.[81]

Egyptian public opinion on the morality of these assassinations remains divided because Egypt never quite slid into full-scale guerilla war for independence as happened in Algeria and Vietnam. It did come close to that in 1919 and 1951-1952. Rightly or wrongly, war can be used to justify anything. Egyptian assassins usually considered themselves at war and in the same category as the politicians who authorize and the soldiers who carry out killing in wartime. Nasser regretted his one attempt, but Sadat and 'Anayat were proud of theirs. "The assassination of Amin Osman," reflected Sadat, "achieved its objective. Apart from removing a staunch supporter of colonialism, we had seriously damaged the prestige of the British authorities and managed to mar the image of effective colonialism, with unprecedented destructiveness, in the eyes of the people."[82]

The major journals usually spoke out against assassination, declaring it unacceptable in civilized societies. The condoning of Husayn Tawfiq's deed in *Ruz al-Yusef* , however, is but one example among many of the opposite position. When those associated with Nuqrashi's assassination were released after the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood's magazine reflected: "Nuqrashi was killed; and he was killed because it was he who planted in the soul of his killer the thought of killing.... For his killing was ... the child of a psychological condition which was created by his terroristic rule, his reckless truckling to imperialism and the king...."[83]

Egypt never did actually wage war on the British, and nationalists from Mustafa Kamil and Sa'd Zaghlul to Nahhas and Nasser never completely gave up on a peaceful path to independence. Ambivalence toward these deeds therefore persists. Except for Sadat, top political leaders in Egypt never publicly boasted of responsibility for earlier assassinations. For a statesman to endorse assassination, after all, is a dangerous as for a king - Louis-Philippe comes to mind - to sanction revolution.

Conclusion

This study has suggested that while earlier Islamic history provided precedents, twentieth-century Egyptian assassinations seem closer to the nationalist assassinations of the modern West than to earlier Ottoman and Egyptian "palace intrigue" killings. Egypt experienced two major waves of assassinations, in 1919-1924 and 1945-1949, with clusters of more isolated incidents in 1910-1915, 1930-1937, and the early 1950s. Tentative and not strictly comparable evidence suggests that this periodization may parallel worldwide patterns. Common nationalist frustration before and after World War I, during the Great Depression, and after World War II may explain such parallels. Assassinations elsewhere in the Middle East followed somewhat different cycles, underlining perhaps Egypt's autonomy within the Arab world. For Egypt the 1948 war with Israel came near the end of a cycle of assassination and other political

[81] Havens, *Assassination*, 98.

[82] Sadat, *Search*, 60.

[83] Editorial in *Majallat al-Da'wa* (22 June 1954), 3, as quoted in Mitchell, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 317-318.

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violence; for some of her Fertile Crescent neighbors, it marked a beginning.

Egyptian assassins were perhaps "sociologically typical" in coming mainly from middle class families, having had exposure to modern thought, and belonging to a youthful intelligentsia of students and professional men. They acted more out of nationalism and - in the case of the Muslim Brothers - religious fundamentalism than out of the democratic ideals, whether anarchist or socialist, often found in their Western counterparts. Severe personal problems also impelled some Egyptian killers to their deeds, while others risked promising career prospects.

Even if one argues that they only accelerated trends already under way, the killings of Ghali, Stack, and Banna' marked significant turning points in Egyptian history. The assassinations of Mahir, Nuqrashi, 'Uthman, and Khazindar had less immediate impact, but taken together with the other violence of the late 1940s they certainly affected the course of Egyptian history.

Because Egypt's independence struggle stopped short of war and because her government had not achieved a consensus on political legitimacy, reactions to the assassins' deeds ranged from jubilation to horror. It seems unlikely that either the Egyptian public or historians will ever reach a consensus on the morality of the killings we have studied, but further research should be able to establish firmer comparisons with assassination patterns elsewhere in the Middle East and the world.

APPENDIX

Table 1

Major Assassination Attempts and Conspiracies to Assassinate

Date	Intended Victim	Name of Principal Accused	Sentence & Disposition	Comments
Feb. 20, 1910	P.M. Butrus Ghali*	Ibrahim Nasif* al-Wardani	Executed	Suspected accomplices released due to lack of conspiracy law
May 1912	Khedive ᶜAbbas II P.M. Muh. Saᶜid Lord Kitchener	Imam Wakid Muh. Tahir al-ᶜArabi Muh. ᶜAbd al-Salam	15 yrs. 15 yrs. 15 yrs.	Abortive conspiracy
July 25, 1914	Khedive ᶜAbbas II	Mahmud Mazhar	Killed on the spot	In Istanbul
April 8, 1915	Sultan Husayn Kamil	Muh. Khalil	Executed	
July 9, 1915	Sultan Husayn Kamil	Muh. Najib al-Hilbawi Muh. Shams al-Din	Death, commuted to life	Seven others exiled to Malta
Sept. 4, 1915	Ibrahim Fathi, Min of Awqaf	Salih ᶜAbd al-Latif	Executed	

*Note: The names of victims who died and assassins who were executed are underlined.

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Sept. 2, 1919	P.M. Muh. Sa^{c}id	Sayyid ^{c}Ali Muh.	10 yrs.	
Dec. 15, 1919	P.M. Yusuf Wahba	^{c}Iryan Yusuf Sa^{c}d	10 yrs.	By a Copt against a Copt
Jan. 28, 1920	Isma^{c}il Sirri, Min. Public Works	Unknown at the time		Sirri resigned Jan. 31. Hasan Tawfiq was assailant
Feb. 22, 1920	Muh. Shafiq, Min. Public Works	^{c}Abd al-Qadir Shihata ^{c}Abbas Hilmi	Death, commuted to life	Had replaced Sirri
July-Oct 1921	Sultan Fu'ad and several ministers	^{c}Abd al-Rahman Fahmi	Death, commuted to 15 yrs	Alleged conspiracy of Revenge Society; 22 others also sentenced
May 8, 1920	Husayn Darwish Min. of Awqaf	Unknown at the time		Ahmad Tawfiq and Muh. Nadim were assailants
June 12, 1920	P.M. Muh. Tawfiq Nasim	Ibrahim Hasan Mas^{c}ud	Executed	
June 1, 1921	Muh. Badr al-Din	Unknown at the time		Controller of Crimes who had played key role in Fahmi case; another attempt on him Jan. 5, 1922, by Mahmud Khalil al-Nahhas
Jan. 23, 1922	P.M. ^{c}Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat & Salim Zaki (police official)	Muh. al-Hasan Sa^{c}d ^{c}Ali ^{c}Ali Rahmi Mahmud Hanafi	2-3 yrs.	Abortive conspiracy
Feb. 18, 1922	Alfred Brown, Comptroller-General of Admin., Min. Education	Unknown at the time		Assailant Ibrahim Musa
May 24, 1922	Maj. Cave, Police Inspector	Unknown at the time		Assailants Ibrahim Musa and Muh. Fahmi
Nov. 16, 1922	Hasan ^{c}Abd al-Raziq Isma^{c}il Zuhdi	Unknown at the time		Lib. Const. leaders mistaken for ^{c}Adli Yakan and Husayn Rushdi
Dec. 27, 1922	Robson, Law School Professor	Unknown at the time		^{c}Abd al-Hamid ^{c}Anayat and Ibr. Musa assailants
May-July, 1923	Victims of 9 different attacks	Ibrahim Khalil Nazir Muh. Disuqi Mustafa ^{c}Ali Fahmi ^{c}Ali	Executed	Others sentenced to prison
July 7, 1924	P.M. Sa^{c}d Zaghlul	^{c}Abd al-Latif ^{c}Abd al-Khaliq	Insane asylum	
Nov. 16, 1924	Sir Lee Stack, Sidar of Egyptian Army & Gov. Gen. of Sudan	Shafiq Mansur ^{c}Abd al-Hamid ^{c}Anayat ^{c}Abd al-Fattah ^{c}Anayat Ibrahim Musa Mahmud Rashid ^{c}Ali Ibr. Muh. Raghib Hasan Mahmud Isma^{c}il	Executed except for ^{c}Abd al-Fattah ^{c}Anayat who received life sentence in return for state's evidence	
Mar.-May, 1926		Mahmud al-Nuqrashi Ahmad Mahir Muh. Fahmi ^{c}Ali Mahmud ^{c}Uthman Must. Ahmad Jad Allah	Acquitted except for ^{c}Ali who was executed	Conspiracy trial

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Aug. 25, 1930	P.M. Isma ʿil Sidqi	Husayn Muh. Taha	7 yrs.	Apparently deranged
May 6, 1932	P.M. Isma ʿil Sidqi			Train tracks blown up
May 16, 1933	P.M. Isma ʿil Sidqi	Mahmud ʿAli al-Fallal		Apparently deranged
Nov. 28, 1937	P.M. Nahhas	ʿIzz al-Din (or Muh. Tawfiq) ʿAbd al-Qadir	10 yrs	

Nov. 1 1944	Lord Moyne, Br. Min. for the M.E.	Eliahu Bet-Zouri Eliahu Hakim	Executed	Members of Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (Sternists)
Feb. 24, 1945	P.M. Ahmad Mahir	Mahmud ʿIssawi	Executed	
Dec. 6, 1945	Must. al-Nahhas	Unknown at the time		Assailant Husayn Tawfiq
Jan. 5, 1946	Amin ʿUthman, ex-Min. Finance	Husayn Tawfiq	10 yrs in absentia	Escaped and fled abroad during trial
Mar. 22, 1948	Ahmad al-Khazindar, judge	Mahmud Zaynhum Hasan ʿAbd al-Hafiz	Life	
April 25, 1948	Must. al-Nahhas	Unknown		Car full of dynamite wrecked his house
Nov. 1948	Must. al-Nahhas	Unknown		Two of his bodyguards killed
Dec. 4, 1948	Salim Zaki, Cairo Police Chief	Unknown		Killed in riot at Medical School
Dec. 28, 1948	PM. Nuqrashi	ʿAbd al-Majid Ahmad Hasan	Executed	
Feb. 12, 1949	Hasan al-Banna' Supreme Guide, Muslim Brotherhood	Ahmad Husayn Jad Mahmud ʿAbd al-Majid Muh. Mahfuz Muh. al-Jazzar	Sentences ranging f. life to one year	Members of Political Police; higher responsibility unproved
May 5, 1949	Hamid Juda, Pres. of Chamber of Deputies	Mustafa Kamil & nine others		Attack intended for P.M. Ibrahim ʿAbd al-Hadi
Jan. 9, 1952	Gen Husayn Sirri ʿAmr	Unknown at the time		Attempt by Nasser and two other Free Officers
Oct. 26, 1954	Nasser	Mahmud ʿAbd al-Latif Muh. Hindawi Duwayr Ibrahim al-Tayyib Yusuf Talʿat Sh. Muh. Farghali ʿAbd al-Qadir ʿAwda	Executed	Prison sentences for other Muslim Brothers

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Table 2

Background of Selected Assassins and Fellow Conspirators

Year of Attempt & Name of Victim	Name of Accused	Age	Family Background	Education	Occupation	Political Affiliation
1910 Stack	Ibrahim Nasif al-Wardani	23	Son of deceased Govt. Offic.; uncle & guardian a pasha	St. Pharm. in Lausanne, Paris, Lon.	Pharmacist	Watani
1912						
Abbas II	M. Tahir al-ᶜArabi	18		Secondary	Student	Watani
Kitchener,	M. Imam Wakid	24		Expelled f. 2ndary school	Ex-student	Watani
M. Saᶜid	M. ᶜAbd al-Salam	24			Journalist	Watani
1914 Abbas II	Mahmud Mazhar	18 or 22	Son of Nat. Courts Judge (a Pasha)	Naval Acad. Istanbul	Student	Watani
1915						
Sultan	M. Khalil	ca.			Tradesman	
Husayn	M. Najib Hilbawi	27		Law School	Student	Watani
Kamil	M. Shams al-Din			Sch. of Commerce (higher)	Student	
1915 Ibrahim Fathi	Salih ᶜAbd al-Latif Badawi	35			Min. Finance employee	
1919 M. Saᶜid	Sayyid ᶜAli Muhammad	17		al-Azhar	Student & Govt. clerk	
1919 Y. Wahba	ᶜIryan Yusuf Saᶜd	ca. 20	Coptic; son of a bey	Sch. of Medicine	Student	Wafdist
1920 T. Nasim	Ibrahim Hasan Masᶜud	ca. 20	3 yrs old when father died	Sch. of Law	Student	
1924 Zaghlul	ᶜAbd al-Latif ᶜAbd al-Khaliq	22	Medical School, Germany	Student		
1924 Stack	ᶜAbd al-Hamid ᶜAnayat	19	Son of govt. engineer	Higher Teach. School	Student	
	ᶜAbd al-Fattah ᶜAnayat	22	Son of govt. engineer	Law School	Student	
	Ibrahim Musa	31			Laborer, RR	
	Mahmud Rashid	33		Vocat. School	Asst. Engin., Roads	
	ᶜAli Ibr. Muh.	22			Laborer, RR	
	Raghib Hasan	23			Laborer, Teleg.	
	Shafiq Mansur	37	Son of law clerk	Law School, scribe	Lawyer Cairo & Paris	Wafdist, ex-Watanist
	Mahmud Ismaᶜil	28		Primary grad.	Clerk, Awqaf	
1937 Nahhas	ᶜIzz al-Din ᶜAbd al-Qadir	ca. 20	Grandson of ᶜUrabi Pasha		typist, Min. of Agric.	Young Egypt
1945 Mahir	Mahmud ᶜIssawi	26	Son of tailor; divorced from Mahmud's mother	Law School	Lawyer	Watani
1946 ᶜUthman	Husayn Tawfiq	20	Son of ex-undersec. of Min Commun. (a Pasha)	2ndary	Student	
1948 Khazindar	Hasan ᶜAbd al-Hafiz	24		Failed out of 2ndary		Muslim Brother
	Mahmud Saᶜid Zaynhum	22		Industrial School	Student	Muslim Brother
1948 Nuqrashi	ᶜAbd al-Hamid Ahmad Hasan	22 or 23	Son of deceased Min. Interior	Expelled f. Vet. School for pol. reasons		Muslim Brother
1954 Nasser	Mahmud ᶜAbd al-Latif	35			Tinsmith	Muslim Brother

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Table 3

Social Background of the Defendants in the Amin ᶜUthman Case*

Age	16-19	20-24	27				Total
Number	12	12	2				26
Education or Occupation	Secondary Student	University Student	Lawyer	Teacher	Misc.		
Number	9	10	2	2	3		26
Father's Rank or Occupation	Pasha & Undersec. of min.	Bey	Other govt. employee	School Principal	Journal-ist	Unknown	
Number	2	5	2	1	1	15	26

*Source: ᶜUthman, Muhakama, pp. 19-26.

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